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From Seniority to Performance Principle - The Evolution of 
Pay Practices in Japanese Firms since the 1990s 
 
Harald Conrad1 
 
[Abstract] After the burst of the bubble economy at the beginning of the 1990s, pay 
practices in Japanese companies have undergone significant changes that are 
characterized by a shift towards performance-based pay.  The purpose of this article is 
to take account of these changes through an analysis of key research and survey 
results, to discuss the degree of success of the new systems, and to examine some 
important interdependencies with changes in corporate governance and labour 
legislation. The success of the evolving systems in terms of increased efficiency and 
effectiveness remains contested, while many companies are still adjusting their 
understanding of performance and their assessment procedures so as to not negatively 
impact employees’ motivation and cooperative work practices. While the influence of 
corporate governance on pay systems remains limited, recent changes in labour 
legislation are likely to strengthen the reliance on performance-oriented pay in the 
future. 
 
[Author] Harald Conrad is Sasakawa Lecturer in Japan’s Economy and Management 
at the School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield. His research focuses on 
Japanese social policy, human resource management and economic issues related to 
demographic change. Recent publications include the co-edited and co-authored 
volumes Human Resource Management in Ageing Societies (Palgrave Macmillan 
2008) and The Demographic Challenge – A Handbook about Japan (Brill 2008).  He 
is currently working on a project that aims to assess changes in occupational pensions 
that are related to the pay system reforms discussed in this article. He can be reached 
by email at h.conrad@sheffield.ac.uk. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the burst of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, changes in the pay practices 
of Japanese firms have received increased attention both in Japanese academia and the 
popular media. The focus of attention has been to what extent the hitherto 
predominantly seniority related compensation practices are being replaced by more 
performance-based salary systems, and what kinds of problems are associated with 
such changes.  
Seniority-based pay (nenkō joretsu chingin) has often been described as one of 
the so-called ‘three pillars of the Japanese employment system’; the two others being 
lifetime employment (shūshin koyō) and in-house company unions (kigyōbetsu kumiai) 
                                                 
1
 I would like to thank the editorial board of SSJJ and three anonymous reviewers for their careful 
reading and thoughtful comments regarding an earlier draft of this article. 
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(e.g., OECD 1977; Debroux 2003). Like many other features of the Japanese 
economic system, it has recently come under increased scrutiny and has been 
criticized for being too costly, and ill-suited to motivate and retain workers in the fast-
changing business environment. One landmark paper reflecting this new sentiment 
was the 1995 report ‘Shinjidai no Nihonteki Keiei’ (Japanese [style] Management in a 
New Era) in which Japan’s business organization Nikkeiren promoted not only a 
greater reliance on fixed-term employment, but also annualized pay schemes (as one 
particular kind of a performance-based pay system) and job-based pay systems for 
highly qualified specialists (Nikkeiren 1995). In the latter half of the 1990s, more and 
more companies, eager to contain rising personnel costs, started to experiment with 
new compensation practices and sought to incorporate more performance-based pay 
elements as part of their overall compensation systems. During this period the term 
seikashugi, roughly translated as ‘performance-ism’, became a frequently heard 
buzzword in the Japanese media.2 Although the meaning of this term is not clearly 
defined and varies among its users (Sasajima Yoshio and Shakai Keizai Seisansei 
Honbu 2002: 7-8; Forbes Nihonban 2004: 128; Ishida 2006; NRSKKK 2006), it 
became a widely held belief that seikashugi was indispensable to secure the long-term 
competitiveness of Japanese companies.  
Whether these reforms have indeed been successful in terms of increased 
efficiency and effectiveness remains contested. In fact, many companies have 
experienced difficulties with their new pay systems and are still in the process of 
adjustment. Also, the popular media (e.g., Shūkan Asahi 2003) and a couple of 
bestselling books (especially Takahashi 2004 and Joh 2004; 2005) have become more 
and more critical of seikashugi and started to promote a revival of a ‘Japanese-style’ 
seniority-based system. It is thus obvious that the reform of pay systems is an on-
going process. Nevertheless, it is also evident that performance factors have started to 
play, and are likely to continue to play, a stronger role in pay determination in the 
future. 
                                                 
2
 According to Sasajima (2004: 22), the four newspapers Nikkei Shinbun, Nikkei Sangyō Shinbun, 
Nikkei Ryūtsū Shinbun, and Nikkei Kin’yū Shinbun used this term for the first time in 1992. Abe 
(2007: 7) reports the following numbers of articles with headings using the phrase performance-
based or achievement-based pay system on the front pages of the morning or evening editions of 
the above papers: 1995: 2; 1996: 5; 1997: 25; 1998: 17; 1999: 34; 2000: 32; 2001: 38; 2002: 25; 
2003:56. 
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 The purpose of this article is to take account of these changes in pay systems 
through an analysis of key research and survey results, to discuss the degree of 
success of the new systems, and to examine some important interdependencies with 
changes in corporate governance and labour legislation.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In order to set the stage 
for an analysis of recent changes in pay practices, the paper first takes a brief look at 
the historical development of the modern pay systems and introduces some of the key 
explanatory factors. This is followed by an overview of the traditional pay practices in 
the third section and a discussion of the driving factors for reform in the fourth section. 
The fifth section describes and analyses recent changes, first in general terms, and 
then focuses on more specific issues. The article closes with a short outlook for the 
future. 
 
2. Historical Development, Complementarities, and Interdependencies 
 
During the late 19th century, wage systems in the private sector were basically 
characterized by a combination of day wages and payment by the job or the piece, but 
many companies had already begun to construct wage ladders of more or less 
complexity to encourage white collar workers to rise in rank and pay within the 
enterprise. Against the background of labour shortages and high labour mobility at the 
time, companies began to increase their day wages at regular intervals to encourage 
their workers to stay with them. However, the fact that regular ‘seniority wage 
increases’ became nearly universal in the heavy industry and other sectors of the 
economy by the end of Word War II was primarily the result of government 
regulation and informal government pressure during the war economy of the 1930s-
1940s. The authorities at the time aimed to restrict labour movement and improve 
industrial productivity through job security and wages that met livelihood or life-cycle 
needs, with age as the best single proxy for need (Gordon 1985: 43-45, 257-298).3  
After World War II, employers hoped to move away from these livelihood 
wages. The emerging management-labour compromise saw thus the establishment of 
wage systems which consisted of several components reflecting mostly livelihood 
factors like age, educational background and gender, but also production quota and 
                                                 
3
 For a detailed account of the history of the seniority-based wage system see also Magota 1970. 
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incentive pay factors (Gordon 1985: 374-386). Following the slow down of the 
economy at the end of the catch-up period and as a result of mounting employers’ 
pressure in the later 1960s, the weight of living-cost and seniority elements was 
gradually reduced while that of work-related elements increased. At the centre of 
these changes was the so-called skill-grading system (shokunō shikaku seido) which 
aimed to link employees’ skills to pay levels, a system that was actively promoted by 
Nikkeiren since the mid-1960s (NNKK 1969; Rebick 2005). Wages were thus, for the 
most part, no longer directly linked to age or tenure, but since employees’ skills were 
judged to increase with longer tenure, the new systems were, as I will discuss later, in 
practice still very much seniority-oriented. The relationship between firm-specific 
tenure, as a proxy for firm-specific human capital, and the earning profiles of 
Japanese workers was highlighted in Hashimoto’s and Raisian’s seminal work (1985) 
as well as in a number of important follow-up studies (Clark and Ogawa 1992; 
Hashimoto and Raisian 1992). These studies, which had the limitation that they were 
based on data stemming from cross-section surveys, concluded that earnings growth 
rates attributable to firm-specific tenure were much greater in Japan than in the United 
States, but showed also that the contribution of firm-specific tenure to earnings 
growth tended to decline throughout the 1980s in large firms, while the results for 
smaller firms were less conclusive. Clark and Ogawa (1992) pointed to the 
diminishing magnitude of seniority pay practices as a possible cause of the flattening 
of the earnings profile, while Hashimoto and Raisian (1992) warned that it was yet 
too early to judge the relative strengths of influencing factors, including firm-size and 
changes in industrial composition. While Hashimoto’s and Raisian’s seminal work 
has shaped many observers’ perceptions of Japan’s seniority wage system, Rebick 
(2005: 20) points to the importance of further studies based on more reliable micro-
level data (e.g., Ohtake 1998) that have subsequently shown that estimated returns to 
seniority or tenure are no higher in Japan than in the US.  
The fact that seniority-orientated wages became widely accepted in the post-
war period can not only be attributed to a political compromise or ideological factors. 
These practices did not only satisfy perceived societal needs, but fit well with the 
emerging Japanese production system. Aoki (1988, 1990, 1994), especially, has 
highlighted the institutional complementarities between human resource management 
practices and the production system of Japanese companies. He has shown how many, 
especially larger, Japanese production facilities have developed operation modes 
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where horizontal mutual coordination among operating units are of utmost importance. 
In this way, planning and implementing operations is not strictly hierarchically 
structured and rotation of employees between engineering and workshop personnel is 
frequently practiced. This teamwork approach, where operating units are expected to 
coordinate mutually their tasks, requires an incentive mode which allows individual 
workers to commit themselves fully to the teamwork process without fear of losing 
compensation. Since workers are expected to cope independently with needed 
changes or problems in the production process, they need autonomous problem-
solving capabilities, which are nurtured by frequent job rotations. Such rotations 
familiarize workers with various jobs and enhance their ability to process and 
communicate information back into the production process. The immediate use of on-
site information in quality control and production planning—such as the famous 
kanban system—has become a key explanatory factor for the competitive strength of 
many Japanese manufacturers.  
According to Aoki, the above sketched production mode requires distinctive 
incentives to ensure that individual workers commit themselves to a team-based effort. 
Japanese companies have therefore designed incentives that are not tightly related to a 
specific job category, but that motivate wide-ranging job experience among 
employees. At the centre of their incentive schemes are rank hierarchies—with 
separate rank hierarchies for blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, and engineers 
as well as for supervisory and managerial employees. Each rank is usually associated 
with a certain range of pay, which consists—as will be discussed in more detail 
later—of several pay elements. Employees of the same educational background start 
their company careers with identical pay and are for some years, until they are in their 
30s, promoted at an equal speed. Around their mid-30s they start to compete for 
promotion in rank. The central criteria for such promotions are the number of years of 
continuous employment and merit. According to the underlying skill-grading system 
merit does not so much depend on a particular job or output, but is broadly defined by 
problem-solving and communication skills as well as other qualifications. Thus 
employees are neither rewarded for achieving a given well-defined objective nor in 
respect of a subjective evaluation of their performance. Rather, frequent appraisals 
assess the potential ability based on adaptability to technical changes as well as soft 
skills such as loyalty and the ability to cooperate well with other workers. It is also 
important to note that speed of promotion does vary in an employee’s later years – 
 7
with some reaching higher ranks only shortly before the mandatory company 
retirement age, whereas others proceed to supervisory ranks in mid-career – and that 
those who do not show continuous progress might be posted to minor subsidiaries or 
affiliated companies.  
Besides the institutional complementarities between human resource 
management practices and the production system of Japanese companies, there are 
also noteworthy interdependencies with corporate governance practices and labour 
legislation. In particular, the long-term nature of compensation practices has been 
compatible with the long-term stakeholder relationships of many companies. Because 
long-term shareholders have traditionally not pursued short-term profit maximization 
strategies and stable cross-shareholdings among affiliated companies prevented 
hostile takeovers, firms were in a position to make long-term commitments to their 
employees, in the form of implicit long-term employment promises and seniority-
based wages. The issue to be discussed below is how recent changes in corporate 
governance practices and shareholder patterns might have influenced these human 
resource management practices.  
Finally, mandatory retirement practices are closely related to seniority-based 
wages. As Lazear (1979) has shown, seniority-based pay is a mechanism to bind 
employees and to set incentives against shirking where the effort of employees is 
difficult to observe or tasks are ambiguous. Firms pay wages below productivity in 
early periods of employment, and raise wages above productivity in later stages. 
Workers can only receive those wages above productivity and regain earlier losses, if 
they show sufficient effort and avoid getting fired. According to Lazear, once workers 
reach the stage where wages are above productivity they have no longer an incentive 
to retire voluntarily. Accordingly, the retirement age has to be fixed in advance to 
control labour costs. And indeed, 91.5% of Japanese companies with more than 30 
employees have such a mandatory retirement system (KDKTJ 2004). The issue to be 
discussed below is how recent changes in labour legislation concerning mandatory 
retirement might impact future changes in the pay systems. 
 
3. Overview of Traditional Pay Components 
 
The previous section outlined the important relationship between the rank-hierarchy 
system and compensation practices. However, compensation is not only a function of 
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rank. In fact, pay systems have been and for the most part remain highly complex and 
take into account numerous factors. Table 1 gives an overview of typical pay 
components. According to the General Survey on Working Conditions, which covers 
establishments with more than 30 employees, total compensation can be divided into 
78.9% monthly cash payments and 21.1% semi-annual bonuses. Base pay makes up 
the largest portion of total compensation, at 67.6%. Furthermore, various allowances 
for the family, commuting, housing, etc. make up another 5% of total compensation 
(Rebick 2005: 45). 
Base pay closely reflects the position of employees in the rank-hierarchy and 
is a function of ability/skills (shokunōkyū), age (nenreikyū) and performance 
(seisekikyū). However, the latter has so far played only a marginal role, whereas 
ability/skills and age have been the most important determinants.4 Most companies 
used to have a pay component which was explicitly and directly linked to age, but 
ability/skills as criteria for the evaluation in the skill-grading system have in principal 
been the most important factors for base pay.  
 
Table 1: Typical Pay Components in Japanese Companies  
 
 
Standard pay 
(kijunnai chingin) 
Base pay (kihonkyū) 
• Age pay (nenreikyū) 
• Ability/Skill pay (shokunōkyū) 
• Performance pay (seisekikyū) 
Family pay (kazokukyū) 
Work-site allowance (gengyōteate) 
Non-standard pay 
(kijungai chingin) 
Overtime pay (jikangai waramashikin) 
Allowances (teate) 
Source: The author. 
 
Bonuses have traditionally been paid bi-annually. Although they might appear 
to have been a kind of profit-sharing scheme, academic opinion on this issue has been 
divided, with some stressing the profit-sharing aspect (e.g., Freeman and Weitzman 
1987), but most others downplaying it (e.g., Ohashi 1989; Brunello 1991; Morishima 
2002). Bonus payments have usually been negotiated twice a year between employers 
and labour unions, and the latter have, at least until recently, considered bonuses as 
                                                 
4
 For a detailed example of a traditional pay system see Shibata (2000). 
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part of regular pay, which should not be linked to company profits. Kato and 
Morishima (2003) confirm that only about one in four publicly traded firms use profit 
sharing plans (PSP), where the total amount of bonuses is linked to a measure of firm 
performance, such as profit.5  
 
4. Pressures for Change 
 
During the latter half of the 1990s the above described pay practices came under 
increasing critique. Underlying this critique are various challenges that I will briefly 
review in this section. 
Probably the single most important challenge is the aging of Japanese society 
and the resulting increase in the number of older employees. The ratio of persons 55 
and older of the total Japanese labour force has increased from 18% in 1985 to 26.8% 
in 2006 (Sōmuchō Tōkeikyoku · Tōkei Kenkyūjo 2008). Given the age-related 
compensation and promotion practices, this has lead to a quasi-automatic increase in 
labour costs and a need to create more managerial positions, although a worsening 
business climate and a general trend towards organizational structures with less 
managerial layers and flatter hierarchies would, rather, demand steps in the opposite 
direction. Since the mid-1990s companies have therefore striven to reduce overall 
personnel expenditures and to turn fixed expenditures into variable costs (Ogoshi 
2006). 
However, as Abe (2007) points out, rising labour management costs alone 
cannot explain the shift to the new salary systems, because there were also periods in 
the past, especially in the 1970s and early 1980s, during which labour costs surpassed 
company income, but which did not lead to any fundamental changes. Technological 
innovations seem to have also played an important role behind recent reforms. 
Innovation in information and communications technology has led to a mismatch 
between the skills of many older white-collar workers and the sort of skills that are 
actually required. The new pay systems try to address this problem with a new 
incentive structure (Abe 2007).  
Overall, the fast-changing business environment and the use of IT have made 
it harder to rely on continuous long-term technological progress and generalist skills, 
                                                 
5
 The productivity effects of bonuses and employee stock-ownership plans have been confirmed 
by Jones and Kato (1995), Ohkusa and Ohtake (1997) and Kato and Morishima (2003). 
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which have so far been comparative strengths of Japanese companies (Miyamoto and 
Higuchi 2007). Related to this point is the problem that the skill-grading system 
assumes a constant accumulation of skills and, in principle, does not take into account 
whether certain skills may have become obsolete due to technological changes.  
In 2000 the Japan Productivity Center for Socio-Economic Development 
conducted a survey among 2,398 stock-listed companies (with a response rate of 
13.2%) in which human resource managers were asked to indicate three major 
problems with the skill-grading system. The results, depicted in Table 2, illustrate 
well some of the above-mentioned problems.  
Most notably, many of the surveyed companies stressed that skill-grading 
systems had in fact turned into seniority-based systems, that they do not allow 
demotion according to actual performance and that the concentration of workers in 
higher ranks causes problems with increasing labour costs. 
 
Table 2: Problems of the Skill-grading System 
 Percentage of 
all companies  
Percentage of 
companies which 
plan to abolish 
ability pay 
The system turns in practice toward a seniority-based 
system 
72.2 84 
The system does not allow promotion and demotion based 
on actual performance 
52.1 44 
The concentration of employees in high ranks causes an 
increase in labor costs 
39.7 60 
The maintenance of the grid with necessary skills takes 
much time 
38.5 28 
Ability/skill standards no longer fit actual conditions 26.8 32 
Skill grades are not understood by the external labor market 24 20 
Skill grades cannot be used in the training of specialists 21.5 24 
Other 2.5 4 
No answer 3.2 0 
Notes: N=317, Up to three possible answers 
Source: Shakai Keizai Seisan Honbu 2000: 45. 
 
 
5. Empirical Evidence of Changes and Their Analysis 
 
As a result of the described pressures, a growing number of Japanese companies have 
started a search for new incentive tools. In this section I will analyse how companies 
have reacted and how these changes can be interpreted. First, I will provide a general 
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overview of recent changes and highlight some major characteristics, and follow with 
a discussion of more specific issues. 
 
5.1 The General Direction of Pay System Reforms  
 
Due to the growing diversity of pay systems across and within companies, generic 
features are nowadays much harder to condense than in the past, when companies 
often followed similar models. Nevertheless, we might try to summarize the general 
trend of the pay system reforms as far as they relate to the core labour force 
(excluding the growing ranks of part-time workers) as follows (based on Ishida 2006, 
Nakamura 2006, NRSKKK 2006): the pay systems of managers (section or 
department managers and above) show the greatest changes, whereas changes for 
rank-and-file employees remain more limited but are also significant. Generally, the 
number of pay components is decreasing. More and more companies are eliminating 
or at least reducing age-based pay (nenreikyū) as well as the different allowances (for 
good examples see the cases discussed by Shibata 2000 and Nakajima, Matsushige 
and Umezaki 2004). For management positions, ability/skill pay (shokunōkyū) is often 
abolished, whereas it continues to play an important but also diminishing role for 
rank-and-file employees. Accordingly, the surveys of the Japan Productivity Center 
for Socio-Economic Development indicate that between 2000 and 2005 the 
percentage of companies that claimed to have ability/skill pay declined from 82.4% to 
57.5% for managers, and from 87% to 70.1% for non-managers (Shakai Keizai 
Seisansei Honbu 2006: 19).6 
For workers in managerial positions, regular pay rises which formed the core 
of the seniority-based wage system have more or less been abolished. For these 
workers, ability/skill pay is often replaced with a pay component that reflects a 
particular job class or hierarchical role that an employee fulfils in an organization 
(yakuwarikyū). There are, however, also companies like Mitsubishi Motors that have 
introduced yakuwarikyū for their manufacturing workers (Mitsubishi Motors 2003). 
As can be seen in figure 1, in over 30% of companies, role/job pay for manager-class 
workers makes up 100% of base pay.  
                                                 
6
 However, it should be noted that the numbers from the different surveys are not directly 
comparable because the responding firms are not necessarily identical. The surveys, conducted 
yearly from 2000 to 2005 among 2,300—2,700 stock-listed firms, have had response rates varying 
between 9.2%—13.3%. 
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Figure 1: Weight of the Role/Job Pay Component (yakuwarikyū) in Base Pay in 
Percent 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Managers Non-Managers
less than 30%
30- under 50%
50- under 70%
70- under 90%
90- under 100%
100%
 
Source: Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu 2006: 13. 
 
Frequently, this job or role pay component consists of a fixed amount and a 
performance-related part, resulting in a monthly salary range. Managers within each 
class receive thus different and fluctuating salaries, depending on the assessment of 
their performance. 
Although role/job pay also plays an increasingly important role for non-
managerial workers, the overall weight of this component, and consequently the 
significance of performance for pay determination, remain limited. Table 3 indicates 
how the weight of the different pay components might change over an employee’s 
career course.  
 
Table 3: Model of the Relative Importance of Different Wage Components over 
the Career Course 
 Non-managerial 
workers 
20s 
Lower managers 
 
30s 
Section chief 
 
40s 
Department 
chief 
50s 
Age pay 
(nenreikyū) 
Seikatsushugi 
OO O - - 
Ability/Skill pay 
(shokunōkyū) 
Nōryōkushugi 
O OO OO O 
Role/job pay - - O OO 
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(yakuwarikyū) 
Seikashugi 
Source: Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu 2002: 17. 
Table 4 summarizes the direction of the current pay reforms for the most 
important pay components. 
What is being evaluated as performance varies among companies and is 
commonly a combination of individual and/or team performance. In regard to the 
performance appraisals, it is important to note that performance is only rarely 
assessed in terms of simple quantitative results such as sales, profits or cost reductions, 
etc. Such an approach might possibly work for sales personnel (where sales 
commissions are commonly found as a top-up for a fixed minimum pay), but in 
general it is not regarded to be suitable, because it neglects various factors which are 
beyond the influence of individual sales people. For example, one might point to the 
general business climate, the behaviour of other workers, or the assigned products 
which have a large impact on sales outcome but are beyond the control of individual 
sales people. For this reason, the new performance systems focus generally on what 
Nakamura (2006; 2007) calls process-oriented performance-based salary systems 
(purosesu jūjigata seika shugi). 
 
Table 4: Common Changes in Pay Systems in Companies that Have Introduced 
Performance-based Pay 
 Past Present/Future 
 
Type of Workers 
Affected 
Base pay -A function of age 
pay (nenreikyū), 
ability/skill pay 
(shokunōkyū) and 
performance pay 
(seisekikyū) with 
different weightings 
depending on the 
career stage 
-Greater weight attached to the performance 
pay component, while ability/skill pay and age 
pay components are reduced or eliminated 
-In some cases base pay is transferred to 
annualized pay schemes where the part of the 
annual salary that is comparable to the old base 
pay remains more or less unchanged, while the 
part comparable to the semi-annual bonus 
depends on individual and/or firm performance 
-All types of regular 
workers, while the 
performance-
orientation is 
strongest for 
managerial workers 
-Annualized schemes 
are usually limited to 
managerial and 
specialist workers 
Allowances -Various livelihood 
allowances reflecting 
the idea of ‘living 
wage’ based on the 
different stages of 
life 
-Livelihood allowances are often transferred to 
base pay 
-All types of regular 
workers 
-Especially workers 
in upper management  
positions and 
specialists that are 
being paid by an 
annual salary scheme  
Bonuses -Usually paid semi-
annually as a defined 
number of months 
worth of base pay 
with little 
consideration of firm 
or employees’ 
performance 
-More and more companies split their bonuses 
into various components including a fixed 
amount and a flexible amount linked to firm, 
individual and/or group performance 
-All types of regular 
workers, although 
bonuses of 
managerial workers 
tend to have a larger 
performance-based 
component 
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Retirement 
lump-sum 
payments 
-Benefits depending 
on age, tenure and 
final salary with 
progressively rising 
benefits 
-Lump-sum payments reflect changes in base 
pay through the benefit formula 
-Some companies have introduced options for 
pre-payment as part of the regular salary 
-Some companies link benefits to employees’ 
performance through merit point systems 
- All types of regular 
workers (non-regular 
workers are typically 
not eligible for those 
benefits) 
Company 
pensions 
-Predominantly 
defined benefit plans 
tied to seniority 
-Many companies have partially replaced 
defined benefit schemes by defined 
contribution plans  
-Some companies link benefits to employees’ 
performance through merit point systems 
-All types of regular 
workers (non-regular 
workers are typically 
not eligible for those 
benefits) 
Employees’ 
appraisal 
-Focus on latent 
skills with strong 
seniority orientation 
-Stronger focus on proven and relevant skills 
with less seniority orientation 
-Many companies have introduced 
management-by-objective-schemes and use 
concept of competency (behavioural 
assessment) 
-All types of regular 
workers 
Note: This table highlights some stylized facts about those companies that have 
introduced performance-based pay. It needs to be kept in mind that there are major 
differences in the way how companies introduce and mix the different measures. 
Source: the author based on Sasajima Yoshio and Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu 
2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007; Rebick 2005; JILPT 2009. 
 
Here, performance is evaluated not only in terms of the degree of success in 
achieving quantitative goals, but also in terms of the process of achieving those goals. 
In a survey conducted by the Japan Productivity Center for Socio-Economic 
Development with 254 responding stock-listed firms in 2005, 90.6% responded that 
they consider processes in their appraisal systems and 89% claimed that an 
individual’s contribution to the team or institution is an important factor in such 
appraisals (Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu 2006: 120). 
Although performance has thus gained in importance as a determining variable 
for pay, skill factors have not been abolished and skill-grading systems still play a 
large role, at least for rank-and-file employees. This is confirmed by a survey of the 
199 largest employers on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, which found that only 23.9 per 
cent of employers that use employee performance to determine employee wages plan 
to discontinue the skill grading system (Morishima 2002). However, whereas 
companies used to operate with an all-embracing concept of skills, which included 
personal attributes such as educational background and age (with a focus on ‘capable 
of doing’), the evolving systems focus more on work-related useable skills and 
performance (with a focus on ‘doing’), with much less emphasis on the age factor. In 
line with this transformation, the rather vague assessment of skills in the past has been 
replaced with more objective ‘management by objectives’ appraisal systems. Despite 
the continuation of skill-based pay systems for rank-and-file employees, this change 
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in skill assessment has in principal capped age-related wage increases as they were 
found in the past. 
Probably the most visible change affecting all types of worker can be 
witnessed in the handling of bonus payments. Bonuses used to be paid as a certain 
number of months’ worth of base pay, usually not strongly reflecting personal or 
company performance. Although there are still differences in arrangements for 
manager-class and rank-and-file employees, the new bonus systems are commonly 
split into at least two parts. One part is still paid as a certain multiple of base pay 
(which, as already described, now depends more on individual performance in the 
case of managers, whereas it is still very much skill-based for rank-and-file 
employees). The other part depends on employees’ performance, with a stronger 
accent on end results for managers and more emphasis on proven abilities for rank-
and-file workers. Furthermore, some companies add a bonus payment component that 
is explicitly linked to company performance over the past year. 
How common are these new performance-based salary systems? In terms of 
the statistical definitions, companies are assumed to have introduced pay for 
performance systems if they assess and reflect an individual’s performance in his/her 
wage, regardless of how much weight is attached to the performance-related part and 
how performance is measured. Based on such a broad definition the General Survey 
on Working Conditions (KDKTJ 2005), covering 5,300 companies with more than 30 
employees and a response rate of 78.5%, reports that 53.2% of companies have 
introduced performance-based wage systems. However, as Nakamura (2006: 16) 
points out, it makes little sense to consider companies that allegedly ‘reflect 
individual performance in pay’ but do not ‘have a performance evaluation system’. If 
we therefore follow Nakamura and multiply the percentages of companies which 
‘reflect individual performance in pay’ with the percentages of those that ‘have a 
performance evaluation system’ we arrive at a more realistic introduction rate of 
33.4%. There are also marked differences varying by company size. Whereas 72.4% 
of companies with more than 1,000 employees have opted for such systems, only 
25.6% of companies with 30-99 employees have done so. The respective numbers for 
companies with 300-999 employees and 100-299 employees are 61.0% and 46.1% 
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(KDKTJ 2005, Nakamura 2006).7 Another large scale 2004 Rengō-Rials survey 
among 1,205 labour unions, with a response rate of 57.1%, shows that 46% of 
companies with less than 300 employees continue to use a traditional seniority-based 
wage system, while the respective percentages for much larger companies with 3,000-
9,999 employees and more than 10,000 employees are 17.8%, and 19.7% (Rengō 
Sōgō Seikatsu Kaihatsu Kenkyūjo 2005: 134-137). Another survey among 11,850 
companies with more than 200 employees (response rate 10.8%) reports a 57.8% 
overall introduction rate of performance-based pay (NRSKKK 2006: 36).  
 
5.2. Specific Aspects of Pay System Reforms 
 
I will now turn to a discussion of some more specific issues, such as: How successful 
are the reformed systems? How have changes in corporate governance influenced 
those systems? What is the relationship with recent changes in labour legislation? 
 
How successful are the reformed systems? 
 
In general, performance-related pay systems are introduced with the expectation of 
increased performance. The most common explanation, stemming from agency theory 
in personnel economics, is that such systems can improve employee motivation, 
which in turn can increase productivity and profits. Other factors that can influence 
productivity include effects on the willingness to collaborate in groups, to increase 
competence, or to focus on strategic tasks (see, e.g., Prendergast 1999 for a 
comprehensive review of the theoretical issues). 
Unfortunately, cross-sectional statistical analyses on the effects of the new pay 
for performance systems on labour productivity and labour costs are rare and have 
rather limited validity because they are not entirely based on firm-level data. However, 
one recent study by Miyamoto and Higuchi (2007), which compares firm-level data 
on the introduction of pay for performance systems with industrial-level data on 
labour costs in 481 firms, highlights some interesting issues. Their regression analysis 
reveals that labour productivity and firm performance (measured as return on sales) 
has increased only in firms where the introduction of the new pay systems was 
                                                 
7
 All numbers are multiplications of the percentages of companies which ‘reflect individual 
performance in pay’ by the percentages of those who ‘have a performance evaluation system’. 
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accompanied by suitable measures of procedural fairness. Only companies which 
disclosed their appraisal standards and results to their employees, which had a 
grievance system for employees to express their unhappiness, and which had 
appropriate communication in the decision-making process, showed a statistically 
significant, though weak, improvement in terms of labour productivity and firm 
performance after the introduction of pay for performance systems. In other words, 
the introduction of pay for performance systems per se does not seem to have 
improved firm performance if these systems are not operated in a fair manner, an 
issue I will come back to below (Miyamoto and Higuchi 2007).  
Another study by the Japan Management Association, conducted in 2004 with 
a comparatively small sample of only 142 firms, showed similarly limited effects. 
Only 48.3% of companies which had implemented a pay for performance system for 
more than 4 years stated improvements in terms of competitiveness and productivity 
(JMA 2005 and Nakamura 2006: 18). With regards to labour costs, Miyamoto and 
Higuchi’s study seems to confirm that pay is indeed lower in industries with a high 
percentage of firms introducing pay for performance systems (Miyamoto and Higuchi 
2007).  
An indirect way to consider labour cost effects is to look at the development of 
age-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles. For the 1970s and 1980s, Clark and Ogawa 
(1992) as well as Ohtake (1998) and Genda (1998) established that the age-earnings 
profile remained stable, while the slope of the tenure-earnings profile dropped more 
than 50%. Rebick (2005: 47-50) extended this work into the 1990s and estimated the 
changes between 1985 and 2003. He found a roughly 20% decline in the effect of 
tenure on earnings over this period, and, more relevant for the discussion here, a 20% 
decline in the effect of experience (measured as age) on earnings. 
Yet another way to ascertain the effects of the new systems is to analyze 
whether they have contributed to an increased dispersion of wages over time. Rebick 
(2005: 51-52), looking at data from the Japanese wage census, comments that there 
has been remarkably little increase in the dispersion of wages between 1980 and 2003 
with the exception of university-educated men, where the dispersion is most 
pronounced for middle-aged men in medium and large firms. He argues convincingly 
that this group is likely to coincide with the managerial class, where, as we have seen 
above, the changes in terms of performance-based pay are most pronounced. This 
view might also, at least indirectly, be supported by recent findings from Kambayashi, 
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Kawaguchi and Yokoyama (2008), whose study of wage distribution between 1989-
2003 shows that in-group wage inequality among male workers expanded after 1997, 
while disparities among workers with different degrees of educational attainment or 
years of service declined over the studied period.  
Shibata (2000), studying the case of one large manufacturing company, finds 
that wage differentials increased after the introduction of a new, performance-oriented, 
wage and appraisal system, but stresses that these differentials are due to small and 
gradual differences appearing over many years. Nakajima, Matsushige, and Umezaki 
(2004), on the other hand, discuss the case of a manufacturing company where a 
performance-based system was introduced, but where uniform evaluations led to a 
decrease rather than an increase in wage differentials and a strengthening of the age-
earnings profile. 
According to the General Survey on Working Conditions (KDKTJ 2001)8 
65% of surveyed companies with more than 30 employees based at least some part of 
their wages on individual performance, while the percentage increased to 82.3% in 
companies with more than 1,000 employees. As Table 5 indicates, the wage decreases 
of bottom performers and increases of top performers remained rather limited, 
although managerial pay was more strongly affected than non-managerial pay.  
 
Table 5: Average Wage Increase/Decrease for Those Performing at the Top and 
Bottom (Percent of Employers Falling in Each Cell) 
   Wage  
Decrease 
10-20% 
Wage 
Decrease 
5-10% 
Wage 
Decrease 
Under  5% 
Wage 
Increase 
Under  5% 
Wage 
Increase 
5-10% 
Wage  
Increase 
10-20% 
 
Managerial 
Position 
Top 
Performer 
-- -- -- 31.1% 28.3% 21.2% 
Bottom 
Performer 
18.3% 25.1% 38.0% -- -- -- 
 
Non-
Managerial 
Position 
Top 
Performer 
-- -- -- 40.8% 31.2% 12.0% 
Bottom 
Performer 
8.1% 27.4% 48.9% -- -- -- 
Note: Companies with more than 1000 employees which link employee performance 
to pay. 
Source: KDKTJ 2001 
 
Overall, these effects seem to indicate that actual wage effects have not been 
as radical as the term ‘seika shugi’ might suggest. One factor contributing to this 
                                                 
8
 The 2001 survey was the last one to look at these effects. 
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finding is probably that companies are still in the process of adjusting their pay 
practices after initial changes had often negative repercussions on organizational 
effectiveness, an issue that I will address now in more detail.9 
A survey by the Institute of Labour Administration (Rōmu Gyōsei Kenkyūjo 
2005) among 1,487 human resource managers (responses 97) and 886 union officials 
(responses 122) of companies listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
from December 2004-January 2005 shows that opinions on the overall functioning of 
the systems are split. 70.6% of managers said that the performance-oriented systems 
were ‘functioning’ or ‘functioning quite well’, 22% claimed ‘neither’ and 7.4% said 
‘not functioning well’ or ‘not functioning’. The labour union representatives, on the 
other hand, had more negative assessments: ‘functioning’: 0%; ‘functioning quite 
well’: 41.3%; ‘neither’: 42.5%; ‘not functioning well’: 13.8%; ‘not functioning’: 2.5%. 
As for the areas that were deemed to have been negatively affected, both management 
and unions named ‘fostering of subordinates’, ‘collaboration in groups’, and ‘latitude 
in regard to work’.  As can be seen from Table 6, the problems that are most dominant 
with regards to the performance-oriented systems concern ‘evaluation and objectives’.  
This finding is echoed by the much more comprehensive General Survey on 
Working Conditions from 2007 (KDKTJ 2007), in which 87.7% of companies with 
personnel evaluation systems reported some sort of problem with these systems. 
Asked to report up to three possible problems, 57.9% of companies reported 
difficulties adjusting evaluation standards among departments, 46.4% said that they 
couldn’t train the evaluators sufficiently, and 35.6% mentioned that it was difficult to 
ascertain differences among employees, with the result that ‘average’ evaluation 
results increased, an issue that was also confirmed by Nakajima, Matsushige, and 
Umezaki (2004).  
These sorts of problems are also at the heart of the criticism voiced in popular 
books on the topic, such as Joh (2004) and Takahashi (2004). Joh (2004) identified a 
number of problems at Fujitsu, one of the forerunners in the introduction of 
performance-based pay, that Meyer-Ohle’s (2009) analysis of employees’ internet 
blog entrees showed not to be restricted to Fujitsu: a decline in morale due to 
grouping in pre-determined performance bands; a split in the workforce and a decline 
in productivity due to the setting of contradictory objectives; a focus on narrow 
                                                 
9
 In the case discussed by Shibata (2000), management agreed to labour union demands that low 
performers not receive lower wages under the new wage system for the first three years.  
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objectives, to the effect that irregular but important or strategic tasks are neglected; 
and increase in un-paid overtime.  
 
Table 6: Problems Concerning Performance-based Pay Systems (Multiple 
Answers in %)  
 Management Union representatives 
Evaluation and objectives 93.3 94.7 
Motivation 46.7 54.7 
Development and rotation 31.7 42.7 
Salary and bonuses 28.3 30.7 
Ranking and qualifications 28.3 24.0 
Working hours 15.0 24.0 
Pensions and retirement allowances 10.0 8.0 
Other - 2.7 
Source: Rōmu Gyōsei Kenkyūjo 2005 
 
Many companies had to concede that they opted prematurely for an increase in 
performance-based pay without establishing clearly the criteria for what was relevant 
to performance, and without institutionalizing the evaluation processes which trained 
managers and allowed them to discuss evaluation results with subordinates.  
Morishima (1997), Fujimura (1998) and Tsuru (2001) have stressed the importance of 
fairness in adjustments of employee evaluation systems and clarity in evaluation in 
order to ensure that employees accept the new performance-based systems, while 
Genda, Kambayashi and Shinozaki (2001) have shown that combining such systems 
with education and training programmes increases employees’ motivation. 
Numerous companies are thus still fine-tuning their reward and appraisal 
systems to meet such challenges. Finding clear criteria for individual performance is, 
however, not always easy, because job descriptions in operational types of work are 
usually not very clear and the lines between individual job and team activities are 
frequently blurred. For this reason a number of companies focus not only on 
individual but also on team performance. One strategy to limit negative repercussions 
on team performance can, for example, be seen at Nissan where individual 
performance measures include factors like ‘willingness to share knowledge’ and 
‘ability to work as a team member’ (Author’s interview with the human resource 
department of Nissan in April 2009).  
 
What has been the influence of corporate governance? 
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Since the mid-1990s Japanese firms have experienced some substantial changes in 
their corporate governance practices. As was pointed out already, the long-term 
orientation of corporate finance and governance has so far shown some important 
complementarities with long-term oriented employment practices. However, with a 
rapid dissolution of cross-shareholdings from around 18% in the early 1990s to less 
than 8% in 2003 among Tokyo-listed companies (Abe and Hoshi 2007: 260), a rapid 
increase in foreign ownership of Japanese companies from 4.2% in 1990 to 16.5% in 
2002 (Ahmadjian 2007: 126), and a growing importance of Japanese institutional 
investors, Japanese firms have recently been exposed to greater financial pressures to 
produce returns for their shareholders (Schaede 2008: 110). This move toward more 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance might provoke conflicts with employees 
over a variety of human resource management issues (Jackson 2007). With regard to 
pay practices we might expect shareholder pressure for the introduction of 
compensation systems that link employee performance with business unit 
performance. Studies in Germany show, for example, that the introduction of 
performance-pay there was associated with changes in corporate governance (Jackson, 
Hoepner and Kurdelbusch 2005). 
Empirical analyses for Japan have not conclusively confirmed such effects. A 
study by Abe and Hoshi (2007), analysing differences between companies that 
maintain a traditional main bank relationship and companies that have a foreign 
ownership structure, found no statistically significant differences in terms of the 
existence of annual salary systems—as one particular example of a pay for 
performance system—and the existence of achievement-linked bonuses. Another 
study by Jackson (2007: 294) came to a similar conclusion: ‘corporate governance 
factors had no significant influence on adopting merit pay elements based on 
individual performance, firm performance, business unit performance, or competitors’ 
wages’. On the other hand, Abe (2007), based on a regression analysis of data from 
451 stock-listed Japanese companies, found a positive correlation between the share 
possession rate of foreign shareholders and the introduction of performance-based 
reward systems.  
These contradicting results might indicate that the linkages between the 
finance domain and employment practices are in reality more loosely related than 
what the theoretical model suggests. Yet, such a conclusion seems premature. In fact, 
the existing statistical analyses have all one major problem which severely limits their 
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usefulness, and that is the poverty of the underlying data which focus solely on the 
presence or absence of a pay for performance system. A more meaningful analysis of 
the relationship between corporate governance factors and pay reform would require 
detailed information on how these systems are implemented in practice and what 
particular meaning a company attaches to the term ‘seika shugi’. However, because 
the understanding of pay for performance varies substantially among companies, the 
available regression analyses do not really give us a thorough understanding of the 
relationship at this point.  
 
What is the relationship between recent changes in labour legislation and pay system 
reform? 
 
The relationship between mandatory retirement and seniority-based pay is a classic 
example of a symbiotic relationship between factors that increase one another’s 
effectiveness. Lazear (1979) has shown theoretically that mandatory retirement is a 
rational practice used in combination with a seniority-based compensation system, 
because workers in their later careers receive wages which surpass their individual 
productivity in order to make up for earlier wage losses. In such a setting, workers 
cannot be expected to retire voluntarily, so firms will try to cap increasing wage costs 
by fixing a mandatory retirement age. If the retirement age is set ‘correctly’, the wage 
sum over time equals exactly the marginal product. In Figure 2 the ‘correct’ 
mandatory retirement age would be at the point where the areas of a and b are of 
equal size. 
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Figure 2: Lazear’s Model of Delayed Payment Contracts 
Source: The author, based on Hutchens 1989: 55. 
 
Mandatory retirement has been very common in Japan. For example, in the 
mid-1970s almost 50% of companies had a mandatory retirement age of 55 years or 
less (SCKKT 1997: 76). Although this practice has its rationality in the seniority-
based pay system and has therefore been favoured by Japanese employers, it has also 
always posed challenges for labour unions and policy makers who have continuously 
sought to close the gap between company retirement and eligibility for public old-age 
pension benefits through an increase in the legal minimum age for mandatory 
retirement (Shintani 2008).  
The legal regulations concerning the minimum mandatory retirement age are 
laid down in the Law Concerning the Stabilization of Employment of Older Persons 
(Kōnenreisha nado Shokugyō Antei Taisaku Kihon) which was enacted in 1986.10 
This legislation and its various revisions have aimed at the gradual extension of the 
mandatory retirement age to 60, a target which was finally made compulsory in 1998. 
Once this target was reached, another revision in 2000 encouraged employers to make 
efforts to ensure stable employment up to the age of 65. These demands were finally 
strengthened through yet another revision in June 2004. According to this latest 
                                                 
10
 See Yamashita 2007 and OECD 1995 for more details concerning this law.  
Time 
W, VMP 
a 
b 
mandatory 
retirement 
age 
wage 
VMP 
Mandatory retirement age where the wage 
sum (W) above the value of marginal 
product (VMP) in later career is equal to the 
sum of wages in earlier career, when wages 
are below the marginal product (a=b) 
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regulation, mandatory retirement at age 60 is still legal. However, the law obliges 
companies to take one of the following steps to enable workers to work beyond this 
age: they can (a) adopt a continuing employment scheme while leaving the mandatory 
retirement age at 60, (b) raise the mandatory retirement age, or (c) abolish the 
mandatory retirement age as such. Continuing employment will, in principle, be 
available for all workers who wish to continue working, but firms can use labour-
management agreements to limit the range of eligible workers. For example, the 
agreements might contain abstract terms such as ‘cooperative person’ or ‘person of 
good work behavior’ (Yamashita 2007). Furthermore, until 2009, temporary measures 
made it possible for companies with more than 300 employees to limit the workers 
eligible for continued employment by stipulating conditions in working rules. 
Companies with less than 300 workers have an even longer grace period, until 2011. 
How these legal changes will impact employment and recruiting practices in 
the long run remains to be seen, but a survey by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy 
and Training among 5,000 companies with more than 300 employees (response rate 
22.1%) from October 2006 showed that 43.6% of companies reacted by introducing a 
reemployment system, whereas 32.7% adjusted their existing reemployment systems. 
Furthermore, 49.3% of companies answered that they planned to increase or had 
already increased their mandatory retirement age. Among those, 63.9% planned to 
raise the mandatory retirement age step-by-step with the increase of the age of 
eligibility for public pension insurance, whereas 32.8% answered that they had 
already raised their mandatory retirement age to 65 (NRSKKK 2007).   
From a company perspective, the described extension of the mandatory 
retirement age over time and the latest provisions to establish continued employment 
programs obviously have cost implications under a seniority-based compensation 
system. Companies are thus facing a social dilemma and a reputational problem: 
when today’s older workers entered their careers, they subscribed to implicit contracts 
according to which their wages would be set below their productivity in their earlier 
careers, but would rise above their productivity in their later careers. Older workers 
are therefore likely to resent the introduction of performance-based pay and insist 
instead on the fulfilment of their implicit contracts. The companies, on the other hand, 
have not only been facing demographically induced increases in their wage costs, but 
are now also gradually losing their mandatory retirement options. From their 
perspective, the introduction of performance-based pay is therefore an attractive 
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option to lessen cost pressures in the short-term, even though such pay systems might 
not necessarily be most compatible with other practices in the companies. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to shed light on the ongoing transformation of Japanese pay 
practices. It is clear that many companies are currently experimenting with new 
compensation practices and that performance-related pay components are becoming 
increasingly popular. However, these changes do not affect workers on all 
hierarchical levels in the same way and tend to apply more to managerial than non-
managerial workers. Moreover, the particular understanding of what performance-
based pay means, how to measure performance, and whether and to what degree to 
focus on individual and/or group performance, varies across firms.  
The success of the reformed pay systems in terms of improved profitability or 
labour cost containment remains mixed. More firm-level studies are needed to 
establish under which specific conditions such systems have improved employees’ 
motivation without negatively impacting cooperative behaviour and strategic long-
term planning.  
The influence of changes in corporate governance on pay systems appears to 
be limited. However, the fundamental problem to conclusively test this relationship 
lies in the poverty of the underlying statistical data which indicate only the existence 
or absence of a performance-based pay system, not taking into account how 
individual firms understand performance and how they implement performance-based 
systems.  
Recent changes in labour legislation in terms of the extension of the 
mandatory retirement age and the latest provisions to establish continued employment 
programs are likely to encourage firms to find ways to further flatten their age-
earnings profiles. It is therefore possible that more and more companies might not 
only consolidate their pay-for-performance systems for managerial workers, but that 
they will also aim to include more pay-for-performance factors into the pay systems 
of non-managerial workers. In any case, against the backdrop of the discussed 
demographic pressures and the need for incentive systems that are compatible with  
the requirements of more specialist workers, we are unlikely to see a major revival of 
the hitherto seniority-oriented wage systems.  
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